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ABSTRACT 
 
This case is appropriate for a course in introductory real estate, real estate analysis, or 
economics. It provides a basis for developing an understanding of the economics of real estate 
markets, price to rent ratios, and speculative bubbles. The student plays the role of an external 
consultant to a fictitious real estate investment firm. This firm is interested in expanding its 
investment portfolio in small towns with tourist based economies. Real data from the Durango 
real estate market is provided. There are signs that the market may currently be in or possibly 
nearing the end of a speculative real estate bubble. Students are asked to evaluate this market and 
form  a conclusion regarding the markets over or under valued condition. This case provides 
students an opportunity to consider property values based on factors other than a discount cash 
flow analysis. Depending on the instructor’s guidance, students can examine the case from two 
processes; 1) use of only the real data provided in the case or 2) further research and gathering of 
additional micro and macro market data. In either case the main objective of the case is for the 
student to develop a formal analysis and draw a conclusion regarding the current local real estate 
market’s over or under valuation condition. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
ila Partners is a Portland, Oregon based real estate investment partnership that has been in existence 
for 10 years.  During those 10 years Jan Dila, Joe Williamson, and Tino Garcia have managed to 
accumulate real estate property with a total asset value of over $60 million.  Their current equity 
position in this partnership totals at just over $6 million.  Their successful strategy for the last 10 years has been to 
examine various small-town markets across the country with a tourism base and make conservative, low risk 
investments in properties in those communities. Their objective has been to maximize investment price appreciation 
with minimal cash flow risk. Jan became interested in Durango, a small-town in southwestern Colorado after 
visiting Three Springs Ranch-a “new urbanism” project being developed by the Ute Indian Tribe.  
 
The firm has compiled the following information, and is providing it to you as its hired consultant for this 
project. The partners are requesting you use the provided information to develop a conclusion regarding the Durango 
real estate market’s over or under valued condition. They have asked for both a written report and a formal 
presentation on your findings. 
 
LOCAL TOURISM ATTRACTIONS 
 
The town of Durango, population 15,000, is located in southwest Colorado, with a total county (La Plata) 
population approximately 44,000. It is a geographically isolated region, does not have an interstate, and the nearest 
major metro area is Albuquerque, New Mexico which is approximately 220 miles from Durango. The next closest 
metro area is Denver, Colorado which is approximately 340 miles away. Durango has an airport, which serves about 
100,000 passengers per year, and is regularly served by only two commercial carriers (United and America West). 
Neither of these airlines provides jet service to the region.  
 
Durango is supported economically by a large tourist industry, and its primary tourist attractions are the 
Durango-Silverton Narrow Gauge Railroad, the Durango Mountain Resort Ski Area and Mesa Verde National Park. 
The railroad serves approximately 100,000 travelers per year for the historic ride between Durango and Silverton. 
D 
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Durango Mountain Resort is approximately 25 miles north of Durango, and has 1200 acres of skiable terrain served 
by 11 lifts. It is one of 25 major ski resorts in the state and is of moderate relative size. Approximately 35 miles west 
of Durango is Mesa Verde National Park, an archeological site with preserved cliff dwellings. They have 
approximately 600,000 visitors per year. By comparison, Yellowstone has about 3 million visitors per year, 
Yosemite has about 3.5million visitors per year and Zion has about 2.6 million visitors per year.  
 
SPECULATIVE REAL ESTATE BUBBLES 
 
Many of Durango’s investors and Realtors believe that the current historically high property prices suggest 
Durango real estate might be in a “speculative real estate bubble”.  Others disagree, and point to the prices of 
properties in other metropolitan and upscale mountain town areas, such as Telluride and Aspen, as evidence of the 
potential upper end of property prices. This last group believes the town will continue to see property values 
appreciate in the foreseeable future. 
 
The term “speculative real estate bubble” has several connotations.  Robert Shiller, a Yale economist and 
author of Irrational Exuberance, defines it as “a situation in which temporarily high prices are sustained largely by 
investors’ enthusiasm rather than by consistent estimation of real value.” (pg. xviii, 2nd edition). John Krainer, a 
Federal Reserve Bank economist states that “A bubble occurs—in either the stock market or the housing market—
when the current price of an asset deviates from its fundamental value.” To make either of these definitions 
meaningful one must understand that the fundamental value of an asset, in an investment sense, is based on the 
timing, risk, and size of the estimated future cash flows from that asset; in this case in an investment property. 
  
Although many may debate whether speculative bubbles currently exist in any given market, after the fact, 
a bubble is generally easily recognized. Everyone now seems to be in agreement that, from 1995 to 2000, the stock 
market experienced a bubble. In the real estate sector, there is general agreement that Japan, and particularly Tokyo, 
experienced a speculative bubble in the mid-1980s. Japanese property prices peaked in 1991 and then fell for the 
next 14 consecutive years (The Economist, 6/18/2005).  
 
THE DURANGO REAL ESTATE MARKET 
 
The town of Durango is nestled in a valley to the east and west, and bounded by a river flood plain to the 
north, severely limiting the ability of the town to expand its housing stock. The current primary corridor of 
development is to the southeast of the town. This area is topographically flat and is currently primarily agricultural 
land, easily lending itself to development.  
 
Some believe that the increase in Durango’s population, coupled with the limited availability of land which 
can be easily built upon, can explain the increase in property prices. However, housing price increases in Durango 
since 1995 appear to have been disproportionately larger than population increases (see Table 1). Larger percentage 
increase in housing prices than population might be explained by an increase in housing stock quality. For example, 
if new homes are built which are of significantly higher quality than the previously existing housing stock, then it 
would be expected that housing price increases would outpace population increases. However, the order of 
magnitude between the population change and the change in the real price of a single family home makes this 
explanation, at best, incomplete.  
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Table 1: Durango, Colorado Population Changes, Average Nominal  
and Real Single Family Prices, and Percent Changes in Prices from 1996 to 20051 
 
Year Durango 
Population 
% change in 
population 
year to year 
Average nominal price 
of a single family 
home, Durango 
Average real price of a 
single family home, 
Durango 
% change in real 
price, year to year 
1996 13,350  $202,611 $252,212.09  
1997 13,278 -0.54% $189,537 $230,632.87 -8.56% 
1998 13,468 1.43% $200,090 $239,739.74 3.95% 
1999 13,731 1.95% $208,455 $244,365.32 1.93% 
2000 13,922 1.39% $239,501 $271,629.18 11.2% 
2001 14,708 5.64% $245,585 $270,822.98 -0.3% 
2002 15,231 3.56% $276,538 $300,210.51 10.85% 
2003 15,324 0.61% $307,119 $325,980.11 8.58% 
2004 15,628 1.98% $343,288 $354,918.72 8.88% 
2005 16,428 5.12% $388,792 $388,792.00 9.54% 
Total % change 23%   54% 
    
 
HOUSING MARKET’S PRICE-TO-EARNINGS RATIOS 
 
Recently, economists have begun to calculate the ratio of the average price of a home to the average annual 
rental rate. This is called the Price to Rent or PR ratio. This is considered to be a statistic that is analogous to a 
stock’s PE ratio.  
 
Stock market analysts often use a firm’s price-to-earnings (PE) ratio, today’s price divided by the previous 
year’s earnings, as a value indicator. PE Ratios indicate the amount that investors are willing to pay, the market 
price of the stock, for a dollar of earnings. Higher PE ratios will reduce investor’s percentage return, but they are 
often justified by pointing to anticipated future growth in earnings. The idea is that the firm’s earnings will hopefully 
“grow into” its current price. Relatively high PE ratios were prevalent during the dot.com boom and can be 
considered warning indicators of a speculative boom. 
 
The logic of a PR Ratio and its similarity to a PE Ratio is straight forward: purchasing a home at a given 
price, P, as an investment, one can expect it to yield one year’s rent, R, as earnings. There are several private and 
published sources of PR Ratios. One such private firm is managed by Edward Leamer, a professor of economics at 
UCLA. Other sources include The Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco which has created a price to rent ratio at 
the national level for the United States for the years 1982 to 2003
2
 as well as The Economist which follows this 
statistic at the international level.  
 
It is important to understand that there is a slight overestimate bias in the PR Ratio in what would be 
considered a “normal” housing market.  To see this, first recognize that there are two types of homes which come up 
for sale: owner-occupied homes and rentals. On average, rental homes are smaller and likely subjected to more 
abuse than owner-occupied homes. As a result, one would expect the average rental home to sell for less than the 
average owner-occupied home (larger and better maintained.) 
 
                                                 
1 Note: average price of a single family home is taken from data published by Don Ricedorff, a local real estate agent. Although 
citing the Durango Area Association of Realtors for this data, they were unable to provide the full time-series and the average 
sales price and volume data which they did provide did not exactly match this data. The differences, however, can be regarded as 
incidental. 
2 For house price, Krainer uses the existing home sales price index published by OFHEO. This is a broad measure of the 
movement of single-family house prices. For rent, Kraimer uses the owner’s equivalent rent index published by BLS. This is a 
time series which attempts to determine price of shelter services provided by owner-occupied housing. That is, it approximates 
what a homeowner would pay to rent, or would earn from renting his home. The owner’s equivalent rent index was calculated in 
different ways for the time periods 1982-1987, 1987-1997 and 1997-2003.  
Journal of Business Case Studies – Fourth Quarter 2007 Volume 3, Number 4 
 62 
If µ is the average price of a owner-occupied home, the average price of a rental will be [µ -- α where α is 
some decrease in value associated with size or quality. Thus, during normal, non-speculative times the PR is 
overestimated for a rental property, since the typical landlord paid less than the average price of a home.  
 
During a time of speculative froth in the real estate market, speculators begin to purchase homes that have 
been owner-occupied and turn them into rentals, which would be expected to affect both the numerator and the 
denominator of the PR. The increase in demand for real estate (from both owner-occupied and speculative 
investment markets) puts upward pressure on the price. The average quality of rentals should increase, putting 
upward pressure on R (Rent). However, the number of rentals supplied to the market will also increase, putting 
downward pressure on R. Thus, it is not clear whether R will rise or fall. However, the rate of change in P should 
overwhelm even an upward movement in R, leading to a rising PR.  
 
Consider what happened to Durango’s PR over a 10 year period. The advantage to considering time series 
data is that the flaw in the statistic remains consistent over time. That is, although the PR for any given year may 
over-estimate what landlords really paid for a dollar’s worth of rent, a rising PR over time should suggest that rental 
housing is becoming a less attractive investment.  
 
AVERAGE RENTAL RATES IN DURANGO 
 
The Colorado Division of Housing, in conjunction with Dr. Gordon Von Stroh of the University of Denver, 
publishes the Multi-Family Vacancy and Rental Survey. Rental rates collected by this survey are for unfurnished 
units where tenants pay electricity and gas.
3
 The survey contacts owners and property managers of multi-family 
rental housing. Participation is voluntary and the information collected on individual complexes is not made publicly 
available.  
 
Table 2 reports the average rental rates reported by this survey. Only rental property within the city limits 
of Durango is considered. The annual figure is created by averaging the February and September rates. The 2005 
September survey considered 583 units. These 583 units consisted of: 31 efficiency units, 122 one bedroom units, 
215 two bedroom/1 bath units, 159 two bedroom/2 bath units, 56 three bedroom units.  
 
The third column of Table 2 converts the nominal rental rates into real values. These real values were 
created using the average CPI for each year. Real rental rates are all expressed in 2005 dollars. Note that real rental 
rates are actually lower in 2005 than they were in 1996. The average real rental rate over the 10 year period was 
$745.  
 
 
Table 2: Average Rental Rates in Durango 
 
Year Average Rental Rate Real Rental Rate % change real rent from 
previous year 
1996 $615.14 $765.68  
1997 $621.09 $755.76 -1.3% 
1998 $526.73 $631.11 -16.5% 
1999 $623.67 $731.10 15.8% 
2000 $652.02 $739.48 1.1% 
2001 $736.30 $811.96 9.8% 
2002 $726.04 $788.19 -2.9% 
2003 $687.22 $729.42 -7.5% 
2004 $734.63 $759.52 4.1% 
2005 $738.13 $738.13 -2.8% 
Source: Colorado Division of Housing Multi-family Vacancy and Rental Survey. Real rental rate calculated using CPI.  
                                                 
3 This is an excellent feature of this data series. Ideally, we would have access to “implicit rent”: what a homeowner would pay to 
rent his home. Because homeowners pay for utilities and furnishings separately, we want to consider the rent on unfurnished 
units where renters pay for utilities. 
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THE DURANGO PRICE TO RENT RATIO 
 
The Economist has tracked the price to rent ratio at the national level for multiple countries.  Their 
methodology compares current (2005) price to rent ratios in a nation to that nation’s 25-year average (1975-2000). 
They found: 
 
house prices have hit record levels in relation to rents in America, Britain, Australia, New Zealand, France, Spain, 
the Netherlands, Ireland and Belgium. This suggest that homes are even more over-valued than at previous peaks, 
from which prices typically fell in real terms…America’s ratio of prices to rents is 35% above its average level 
during 1975-2000. By the same gauge, property is overvalued by 50% or more in Britain, Australia and Spain.  (The 
Economist, June 18, 2005) 
 
Table 3 depicts Durango’s historical PR Ratio. Column two (PR Ratio 1) was constructed using the average 
price of a single-family home in Durango. This allowed for the longest possible time series. Using the methodology 
of The Economist, an average price to rent ratio of approximately 25 for the years 1995-2000 is calculated. This 
means the price to rent ratio in 2005 is more than 70% above its previous average. By The Economist’s standards, 
the Durango real estate market would be considered to be significantly over-valued. However, The Economist is 
comparing recent performance to a 25-year average as opposed to the 5-year average available for the Durango 
market.  
 
 
Table 3: Average Price to Rental Ratios in Durango 
 
Year PR Ratio 1 PR Ratio 2 PR Ratio 3 
1996 22   
1997 21   
1998 26   
1999 28 22 16.3 
2000 31 25 17.5 
2001 28 22 15.9 
2002 32 27 18.2 
2003 37 30 20.8 
2004 39 34 28.4 
2005 44 38 31.6 
 
 
Table 4: Percent change in the price to rent ratio between 2000 and 2005 for Durango, Colorado 
 
Place % change 
Price to Rent Ratio 1 41.9% 
Price to Rent Ratio 2 52.0% 
Price to Rent Ratio 3 80.5% 
 
 
Table 3, PR Ratio 2 was constructed using a weighted average
4
 price. This weighted average considered the 
price of single family homes, town homes and condominiums. The PR constructed using this approach applies a 
more consistent comparison; the rental market consists of a mix of homes, town homes and condominiums. 
However, data on town home and condominium sales was unavailable before 1999 (data supplied by the Durango 
Area Association of Realtors). Column 3 shows a 52.0% increase in the price to rent ratio between 2000 and 2005 in 
Durango. Using the data for PR Ratio 1, there was a 41.9% (Table 4) increase in the price to rent ratio between 2000 
and 2005.  
 
                                                 
4 [(# of homes sold)(avg. price of a home) + (# of condos~-townhomes sold)(avg. price of a condo~ townhome)] 
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Table 3, PR Ratio 3 was constructed using only the average price of town homes and condominiums. A 
home often comes with certain features (for example, a yard) that multi-family units don’t have. As a result, 
comparing average home price to the average rental rate of apartments will bias the PR upward. Calculating the PR 
using only condo and townhouse prices generates a more believable number. That is, the pure PR of 31.6 is within 
the upper range of the PR in other major metro areas. The other PR’s which we have calculated were out of this 
range.  However, calculating the PR using only condo and town home prices yields an 81% increase in the price to 
rent ratio between 2000 and 2005. 
 
The New York Times contracted with Economy.com to calculate the price to rent ratio in major metro areas. 
Table 5 shows the percent change in the price to rent ratio between 2000 and 2005 in ten metro regions considered 
to be at risk of a speculative bubble. The average percent change in the price to rent ratio in these ten regions was 
130%. Table 6 shows the percent change in the price to rent ratio between 2000 and 2005 in ten metro regions where 
home price growth has been much more stable. The average percent change in the price to rent ratio between 2000 
and 2005 in these ten regions was 17.6%.  
 
 
Table 5: Percent change in the price to rent ratio between 2000 and 2005 in areas considered to be as speculative risk. 
Based on data collected by Economy.com and reproduced in the NY Times, May 28, 2005 
 
Place % change 
San Francisco, CA 173% 
San Jose, CA 141% 
W. Palm Beach-Boca Raton, FL 153% 
San Diego, CA 114% 
Sacramento, CA 130% 
Orange County, CA 118% 
New York City metro area 140% 
Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA 102% 
Fort Lauderdale, FL 111% 
Miami, FL 113% 
 
 
Table 6: Percent change in the price to rent ratio between 2000 and 2005 in areas considered to be stable. Based on data 
collected by Economy.com and reproduced in the NY Times, May 28, 2005 
 
Place % change 
Tulsa, OK 24.7% 
Oklahoma City, OK 25% 
Pittsburgh, PA 28.6% 
Columbus, OH 15.7% 
Birmingham, AL 17% 
Salt Lake City, UT 18.3% 
Indianapolis, IN 10.3% 
Greenville-Spartanburg-Anderson, SC 12.3% 
Albuquerque, NM 3.5% 
 
 
Using PR metrics suggests that Durango is not at either extreme. Durango may not be as likely to suffer a 
prolonged real estate price contraction as are California and Florida. However, growth trajectory has not been as 
secure as it has been in many of the mid-western areas.  
 
CONTAGIONS: IN-MIGRATION TO DURANGO 
 
Even if Durango itself has not experienced a speculative run-up in real estate prices, there is concern 
among the partners that it could import the positive or negative effects of other real estate markets providing either 
net in or out-migration to Durango.   
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To begin to address this concern, data was obtained from an extensive data base of real estate transactions 
in the Durango region
5
 and illustrated in Table 7 below. It was developed by reviewing the transfer deed for all 
residential real estate transactions in La Plata County. Out of 1328 transfer deeds, 514 of the purchasers of real 
estate were already living in La Plata County. That is, about 39% of the homes sold in La Plata County went to 
individuals who were previously renting a unit in La Plata or who had sold one home here and bought another (an 
in-area re-location). About 8% (105) of the homes sold in La Plata County were purchased by individuals who had 
previously resided in neighboring counties (San Juan, NM; Archuleta, CO; Montezuma, CO; Montrose, CO). Just 
over half of the homes in La Plata County are purchased by individuals who previously lived outside of the four 
corners region.  
 
 
Table 7: La Plata Country In-Migration Characteristics for Property Purchasers based on Transfer Deeds 
 and U.S. Internal Revenue Service Data. Data collected Bob Allen, Durango, Colorado 
 
Purchaser Previous Location Number  Percent 
La Plata County (current resident) 514  39% 
Neighboring Counties* 105  8% 
Outside Four Corners Region    
Front Range counties: Denver, Boulder, Jefferson, Larimer, El Paso and Arapahoe  8%  
Colorado: Other  25%  
Maricopa County (Phoenix) Arizona  2%  
Arizona: Other  3%  
Texas  3%  
California  5%  
Florida  2%  
California  5%  
Total: Outside Four Corners Region 709  53% 
    
Total Transfer Deeds 1328  100% 
* San Juan, NM; Archuleta, CO; Montezuma, CO; Montrose, CO 
 
 
U.S. Internal Revenue Service data provides additional insight into where Durango in-migrants are 
relocating from. About 7.5% of La Plata County homes are purchased by people who had previously resided in six 
Front Range counties: Denver, Boulder, Jefferson, Larimer, El Paso and Arapahoe. About 2% of Durango homes are 
purchased by people who had previously resided in Maricopa County, Arizona (which is home to Phoenix). Using 
transfer deed data, Allen calculates that about 2% of all of the La Plata County homes sold go to former Floridians, 
3% go to former Texans, 4% go to former Arizonians, and 5% go to former Californians. About 33% of La Plata 
County homes are sold to Coloradoans who previously lived outside of La Plata, Archuleta, Montezuma and 
Montrose Counties.  
 
CONTAGION: SECOND HOMES 
 
The Region 9 Economic Development District of Southwest Colorado commissioned a study on second 
homes in Southwest Colorado. They defined second homeowners as property owners whose mailing addresses are 
outside of the county in which they own property. Thus, second homeowners would, generally, be categorized as in-
migrants in a transfer deed data set since their address on the transfer deed would be outside of the county.
6
 
However, they are not, in fact, in-migrants; their primary residence is outside of La Plata County.  
 
                                                 
5 This data was supplied by Bob Allen, a private real estate consultant who conducts appraisals and performs market analysis.  
6 The exception to this generality would be someone who purchased a property in La Plata County, moved outside of the county, 
but did not sell the property. On a transfer this person would appear to be a local, living in La Plata County, even though they 
now actually own a second home in La Plata County. 
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The data collected and presented in Table 7 above is flow data, indicating that in any given year about half 
of the homes in La Plata County are purchased by individuals who previously lived outside of the four corners 
region. This is important in determining who is driving annual demand for home purchases.  
 
The data collected by The Region 9 Economic Development regarding second homes is stock data. It is the 
result of many years of accumulated flows. It tells us how much of our current housing stock is owned by non-local 
residents. Specifically, 17% of single family dwellings and 55% of condominiums in La Plata County are owned by 
non-locals. 
 
The Region 9 Economic Development study reveals the location of second home owners’ mailing 
addresses. This is reproduced in Table 8.  They aggregate all types of properties: residential, vacant lands and 
agricultural lands. Nonetheless, it provides a notion of the origin of external demand for real estate in La Plata 
County.  
 
 
Table 8: Mailing Address, by State, of Non-Locals who own property in La Plata County  
as a % of all non-locals who own property in La Plata County 
 
State % 
Arizona 16% 
California 15% 
New Mexico 15% 
Texas 14% 
Colorado 13% 
Florida 4% 
 
 
Comparing the flow data from Table 7 stock data of Table 8,  it is clear that out-of-state demand, be it for 
second homes or in-migration, comes primarily from Arizona, California, Colorado, New Mexico and Texas.  
 
EXTERNAL REAL ESTATE MARKETS IMPACTING DURANGO 
 
Recall that about 50% of Durango real estate is sold to individuals who previously lived outside of the four 
corners region., thus it is important to know the health of the real estate markets from which out-of-area purchases 
come. 
 
According to The Wall Street Journal (7/20/2006, D1), the real estate market in Texas is healthy. In 
Houston, housing inventory is shrinking, home prices are heading up and job growth is very strong. In Dallas, 
housing inventory is up slightly, home prices are heading up and job growth is very strong. In Denver, the real estate 
market is softening, with inventories rising by 24% over the last year and home prices heading down. However, the 
job outlook in Denver is characterized as strong. In California, housing inventories have risen much more 
precipitously. Relative to last year, inventories in Los Angeles are up 175%, in San Francisco they are up 112% and 
in San Diego they are up 92%. Job creation in San Francisco and San Diego are both regarded as average whereas 
job creation in Los Angeles is projected to fall below the national norm. In Phoenix, the year over year change in 
housing inventory is a remarkable 298% and housing prices are falling. However, their job outlook is characterized 
as very strong. In Miami, housing inventory is up 245% and the employment outlook is characterized as weak. 
However, population growth is expected to absorb the accumulated housing inventory over the next year to 18 
months. In Tampa housing inventory has grown by 294% over the last year and in Orlando housing inventory has 
grown by an astounding 397% over the last year. Both markets are experiencing declining prices but their 
employment outlook is strong.  
 
None of these feeder markets appear to be imploding. However, the California, Florida and Arizona 
markets are clearly weakening. The Durango real estate market is vulnerable to declines in these markets.  
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FINAL NOTES 
 
Dila Partners is specifically considering investment in the “Three Springs” sub-division currently under 
construction at the southeastern edge of the town. It is estimated that 150 homes per year will be built in this sub-
division over the next 10 years. In contrast, there were 219 in-town homes sold, 267 condos/town homes sold and 
357 country homes sold in the Durango area during 2005. Using this broad measure total (843), the Three Springs 
development will result in an annual increase in available homes of about 18%. This is a conservative estimate.  
 
While the firm has compiled substantial information, it is providing it to you as its hired consultant for this 
project. Your past record with the firm has led them to believe that your assessment of the market and its over or 
under valued condition is critical to their decision process. They have asked for both a written report and a formal 
presentation on your conclusions. 
 
Teaching Notes 
 
Study replication:  
 
1. The hardest part of replicating this study for another housing region is locating the average rental rates. 
Note that the information for this case study came from the Colorado Division of Housing. The state is 
interested in the availability of affording housing and average rental rates are part of making this 
determination. Try searching at your state’s equivalent to the Colorado Division of Housing to find average 
rental rates.  
 
Average housing prices can typically be found from your local Realtor Association. Many real estate firms 
also keep track of this data. As is mentioned in the case study, it is preferred to gain access to a data set that 
includes condos and town homes in addition to single-family dwellings. 
 
In-migration statistics can be found from IRS tax payer migration data. This is probably only necessary if 
the market you are studying is also resort region.  
 
 
2. Begin by asking your students to discuss the important details of the discounted cash flow analysis when 
considering real estate investments.  Since this case is basically an assessment of the risk of investing in the 
Durango market, ask them to explain how this type of risk might be incorporated into a discounted cash 
flow analysis. 
a. One way that risk might be incorporated into a discounted cash flow analysis is through the use of 
a scenario analysis. In a scenario analysis one might consider a high, medium and low rental rate 
for the properties. In this case three scenarios would be developed. Additionally, one could 
consider a high, medium and low future value of the property based on the speculative nature of 
the market. In this way, the risk is incorporated into the actual cash flows of the project. 
b. A second way risk might be incorporated is through variants of the discount rate. The firm should 
consider its average discount rate for projects that are of average risk. If this project was 
considered riskier than the other real estate investments in the firm’s portfolio, then the discount 
rate could be increased to compensate for this risk. 
 
3. Ask the students to relate how a study of the market, as this case does, is directly related to a discounted 
cash flow analysis. 
a. This case sets up a basis for risk adjustment in the discounted cash flow analysis approach. By 
studying the market in a different geographical region, a more accurate assessment of the risk of 
investing in the geographical area is determined. Since this is potentially a speculative real estate 
market, and the firm is concerned that we are at the end of this cycle, there is considerable reason 
to carefully evaluate the market and determine whether the rest should be adjusted. 
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b. The specific risk adjustments that could be incorporated into the discounted cash flow analysis 
after the market study and conclusions are complete, is outlined in question two above. 
 
4. Discuss with your students possible flaws in the data and how these flaws might bias the results. For 
instance: 
a. Average rental rates reflect the rents of multi-family housing units. If a significant percent of the 
rental stock consists of homes, privately owned condos or town homes, or rooms in homes then 
this data might not reflect the true average amount paid by renters. Whether the reported average 
is biased up or down will depend on the quality of the multi-family units relative to individually 
owned rental units. Of course, rents aren’t set in a vacuum. As rental rates for multi-family 
housing units change this will affect what owners of individual rental units can charge.  
b. The P in the calculated PR is the price of a home. Homes can be rented. However, the R in the PR 
is not the average rent paid on a single-family home. The R is the average rent paid on a rental unit 
in a multi-family complex (an “apartment building”). It initially appears that in calculating the PR 
we are comparing apples to oranges. However, the rent which can be charged on a X-bedroom 
house influences the rent which can be charged on a X-bedroom unit in an apartment complex. 
These rents are not identical values but they tend to be closely related. If rents on two-bedroom 
apartments rise there is every reason to think rents on 2-bedroom homes will also.  
 
5. Ask your students to explain why the comparison of PR ratios across regions is done on a percent basis.  
a. The value of a time series data is that flaws in the data are held constant. Thus, in a particular 
region, changes in the PR over time are informative even if the PR itself is not a “perfect” statistic.  
b. However, to compare across regions at any particular point in time, the PR ratio must have been 
calculated in the same way for both regions. Thus, we do not compare the PR in San Francisco 
with the PR in Durango. In fact, the published PR in San Francisco in 2005 was 34.1. Since the 
calculated Durango PR was higher (unless you use the condo-townhome only data), it is highly 
likely that Economy.com used an alternative (and probably superior) data set. They may have had 
access to the average price of a rental home which they could compare with the average price of a 
home. They may have been able to adjust this figure, as the Department of Labor does, into a 
rental equivalence statistic. Nonetheless, comparing the percent change in a consistently flawed 
statistic with theirs is a meaningful calculation. 
 
 
6. Ask your students to discuss how speculative bubbles in other markets might affect the demand for real 
estate in the Durango market. 
a. If a substantial percent of housing demand comes from individuals who are located in booming 
markets, these potential in-migrants might be more likely to liquidate their present real estate 
holdings in order to re-locate to Durango thus increasing demand for Durango homes. 
b. If a substantial percent of housing demand comes from individuals who are presently living in 
regions where housing prices are already declining and housing inventory is building, they may be 
unwilling to liquidate their current holdings and there-by lock-in their loss.  
 
7. Discuss the difference between flow data and stock data.  
a. Flow data (the Bob Allen data) tends to be superior because it is more recent and tends to give a 
better picture of the origin of demand on a regional basis.  
 
8. Discuss with your students when it is appropriate to use real data and when it is appropriate to use nominal 
data.  
a. For instance, in Table 1 the real price change must be compared with the change in population. 
Using the nominal change in housing prices would exaggerate the difference because it includes 
the effects of inflation. In nominal terms, rental rates went up between 1996 and 2005. However, 
when the effect of inflation is netted out, an average landlord is earning less from his rental 
property in 2005 than he did in 1996! 
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9. Ask your students to consider why PR ratios don’t need to be calculated in real terms. 
a. PR ratios do not need to be calculated in real terms sine they are a pure number (the $s in the 
numerator and denominator “cancel out”).  Thus, they can be compared over time without bias. 
 
10. Ask your students to consider the fact that the firm uses an average discount rate of 20% for its average risk 
projects. Tell them that the next step in the process, but not to be completed for this case, is to conduct a 
discounted cash flow analysis of the project. Recall that the firm’s investment strategy is to make a series of 
conservative investments in properties. Based on their conclusion regarding the speculative nature of this 
market, ask them to comment on how they might proceed with a discount rate risk adjustment in their 
discounted cash flow analysis. 
a. It is unlikely that anyone will make an effective argument that the Durango market is less risky 
than the firm’s current investment portfolio, even though that information has not been provided. 
The fact that the firm makes conservative investments and, at the very least, this market appears to 
have some risk, the argument for decreasing the discount rate cannot be made. 
b. Some students may argue that the rest of the Durango market might be of the average risk with 
other investments in the firm’s portfolio. Although this is unlikely, in the event that this argument 
is made and concluded by the class that discounting of the estimated cash flows should be at the 
firm’s average 20%. 
c. It is likely that the class will conclude that the speculative nature of the market indicates that in the 
investments in this market will be of higher risk than the firm’s average risk investments. If this is 
the case, then there can be considerable discussion about the specific increase in the discount rate. 
There is no correct answer here, but this provides a basis for a lively class discussion. 
d. One possible way to illustrate the impact of increasing the discount rate on the project’s value is to 
set up a brief spreadsheet with some sample cash flows, and estimated future value of the property. 
Various discount rates for this project’s cash flows can be used to illustrate the impact and range 
of values obtained when increasing the discount rate. This will give the students a general feel for 
a reasonable range of discount rates to consider. 
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